We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the number of tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending on the type of regime. In both stages, special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor. We find that (i) both the choice of regime and the level of aggregate emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups, and (ii) an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the less preferred regime.
Introduction
When analyzing international (environmental) policy, we often consider individual countries to be represented by a single benevolent decision maker, e.g. a government, acting in the best interest of the country as a whole. In this paper, we depart from this idealized abstraction by assuming that each country's decision maker is vulnerable to the influence of national political competition. Then, international policy is governed by two forces: (i) the influence of political competition on a national level and (ii) the interplay of national governments on the international policy arena.
By political competition we mean that incumbent politicians do not only consider the welfare of the general electorate (national social welfare) but are also susceptible to the influence of lobby groups which try to sway them in their favor by providing campaign contributions, information or simply bribes. This may give them an advantage over their challengers at the next election and hence increases their likelihood of reelection.
Deviating from the socially optimal policy, however, leads to an alienation of voters and decreases this likelihood. Policy-makers thus face a trade-off between maximizing political support by interest groups and maximizing national social welfare.
On the international level, the particular environmental policy we consider is the noncooperative formation of an international emission permits market (Helm 2003) . Our choice for non-cooperative climate policies is twofold. On the one hand, the interna- Thus, we analyze the political economy of international climate policy in a framework comprising two countries and two stages. In the first stage, governments in each country decide whether to join an international permit market or not. If both countries agree to form a permit market, the decision on the number of permits is taken in the second stage. If no agreement has been reached in the first stage, governments decide upon national emission targets in the second stage. In both stages, governments are subject to 1 political influence by national interest groups. As a consequence, governments are supposed to maximize a weighted sum of national social welfare and lobby contributions.
Social welfare in each country comprises benefits of national and environmental damage costs of global emissions. If a permit market has been put in place, an additional term enters the welfare function which captures the revenues from permit sales or the costs associated with permit purchases. Within this framework, we analyze how national lobbying influences non-cooperative international environmental policy and if (and how) the distribution of special interest groups affects the equilibrium outcome.
We find that the number of tradable or non-tradable emission allowances, depending on the type of regime, is determined by the aggregate level of organized stakes in both countries, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive contribution schedules.
This implies that for given national aggregates neither the number nor the composition of special interest groups matters for national and international emission levels. Further, we show that for the case of grandfathered emission permits, the influence of political competition on the national level can be captured by politically adjusted damage functions. Also the choice of regime in the first period, i.e. whether an international permits market is set up, does not depend on the distribution of organized stakes among special interest groups, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive contribution schedules. In addition, we find that an increase in influence of a particular lobby group may weaken the support for the interest group's preferred regime in both countries. The reason is that, although there exists a direct effect in favor of the interest group's preferred regime, there is also an indirect effect in both countries, due to the strategic interactions on the international level, which may outweigh the direct effect.
Our paper combines two strands of literature. It adds to the literature on non-cooperative international permit markets, originating in Helm (2003) and Carbone et al. (2009) , by introducing a political economy framework in the tradition of Grossman and Helpman. While Helm (2003) and Carbone et al. (2009) assume benevolent national governments and leave out the possibility of swaying policy-makers, the literature on special interest groups originates from issues in international trade where stakeholders have long played an important role in determining a country's trade policies. In finding the equilibrium of our game, we use the political economy approach ("common agency") originally developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and extended by Grossman and Helpman in various seminal contributions (Grossman and Helpman 1994 , 1995a ,b, 2002 . We focus our analysis in the second stage on "truthful" Nash equilibria, i.e. we assume that lobbies, at the margin, contribute according to the marginal change in their welfare induced 2 by a marginal change in policy. To determine the equilibrium in the first stage, we follow Grossman and Helpman (1995a) in their analysis of free trade agreements. In contrast to their model setting, our model comprises a continuous policy variable in the second stage, the number of tradable or non-tradable allowances.
There is another closely related strand of literature which examines the political economy of tradable emission permits, in particular the question whether permits will and should be auctioned or grandfathered in political equilibrium (Lai 2007 (Lai , 2008 . While Lai's analysis is confined to the national level, we are particularly interested in how political competition on the national level influences international policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The following section introduces the basic economic model and the political actors. Section 3 is concerned with the second stage of the game in which the number of tradable or non-tradable allowances is chosen.
The decision in the first stage is analyzed in Section 4 before we discuss and generalize our results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2 and −i = {1, 2} \ i. 2 In each country i, emissions e i imply country-specific benefits from productive activities B i (e i ) with
i > 0 and B ′′ i < 0 for all i = 1, 2. Global emissions, E = e 1 +e 2 , cause strictly increasing and convex country-specific damages D i (E) with D i (0) = 0 and D ′ i > 0, D ′′ i ≥ 0 for all E > 0 and i = 1, 2.
Non-cooperative international climate policy
Countries may agree upon introducing an international emission permit market in which each country i non-cooperatively decides on the amount of emission permits ω i it issues to its domestic firms. Firms in each country need (at least) emission permits amounting to emissions e i . The permits are traded on a perfectly competitive international permit market at price p. As a consequence, national social welfare is given by:
Due to national sovereignty, an international permit market is only introduced if both countries are willing to participate. If this is not the case, both countries set national emission caps e i non-cooperatively. Then, social welfare reads:
Political actors
We assume that each country i is represented by a government deciding on its environmental policy. Governments face two consecutive decisions: (i) a binary decision whether the respective country wants to participate in an international emission permit market and (ii) contingent on whether an international permit market is formed the choice of the level of issued permits or national emission caps. Governments in each country are assumed to care about national social welfare but are also vulnerable to lobbying contributions of special interest groups.
We assume that there are M i interest groups in country i, which exhibit different stakes in the elements of the social welfare function W i . 3 The degree to which interest group j benefits from emissions is defined as 0 ≤ β ij ≤ 1, with the aggregate national level
, whereas it suffers from damages caused by emissions to the degree 0 ≤ δ ij ≤ 1, with
If an international permit market is set up, social welfare (1a) encompasses a third component, the net revenues from permit trade, which is positive if a country has lower emissions than emission permits issued. The interest groups' stakes in these revenues are denoted by 0 ≤ ρ ij ≤ 1, with
denotes the share of emission benefits (damage costs, net revenues from permit sales) in country i which is under the control of organized special interest groups.
Organized interest groups in country i offer contributions to the local government in order to sway chosen policies in their own favor. We model the two policy decisions the governments face as a two-stage game. As a consequence, lobby groups may offer contributions for each of the policy decisions individually. Governments in all countries are assumed to care about the weighted sum of national social welfare and lobbying 3 Note that not necessarily all stakeholders are able to overcome the collective action problem described by Olson (1971) and organize themselves as lobby groups. As we will see later, if not all stakes are represented equally, a political distortion in the allocation arises due to lobbying.
contributions:
where R = {T, N T } denotes the type of regime (T = trading if an international emission permit market is formed and N T = no-trading in case of national emission caps), θ i the relative weight the government in country i attaches to lobbying contributions compared to national social welfare W R i , and C
1,R ij
and C
2,R ij
are the lobbying contributions of lobby group j in country i in the first and second stage, respectively, contingent on the implemented regime.
Lobby groups are assumed to maximize the total pay-off of their members, which is the organized stakes in national social welfare U R ij that the lobby group j in country i represents minus lobbying contributions in the first and second stage:
with
Note that the definition of equations (2) and (3) implies that the chronology of events is such that we may abstract from discounting outcomes accruing at different stages.
Structure of the game
We model the consecutive decisions on the choice of regime and the national environmental policy as a non-cooperative two-stage game. In the first stage, governments of both countries simultaneously decide whether to take part in an international emission permit market. An international permit market only forms if both countries consent to it. In the second stage, the governments simultaneously decide on the national environmental policy, which is the amount of emission permits issued in case an international permit market is formed in the first stage or the national emission caps otherwise.
In our model setup, two separate non-cooperative games coincide on each stage: On the one hand, organized interest groups act non-cooperatively in choosing their contri-bution schedules to influence the respective government's policy variable. On the other hand, countries decide non-cooperatively on international environmental policy. As a consequence, each of the two model stages comprises a lobbying game in each country Helpman 1994, 1995a) . 4 In the following, the complete timing of events is outlined:
1. Regime choice a) All organized lobby groups j in both countries i simultaneously offer a contribution schedule contingent on the policy choice of the local government, taking the contribution schedules of all other lobby groups and the decision of the other country as given. As outlined in Section 2.3, the second stage splits into multiple sub-stages.
We seek the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative game in the second stage for truthful contribution schedules of all interest groups (Grossman and Helpman 1994) . 5 Truthful contribution schedules reflect the true preferences of the lobby groups. For any policy, lobby groups pay to the local government their gross utility U R ij minus some base utility level R 2,R ij , or formally
A truthful contribution schedule is always continuous and differentiable at least as long as it is positive, as R 2,R ij is a scalar and U R ij is twice continuously differentiable.
National emissions caps under lobby group pressure
We first assume that no international permit market has been formed in the first stage of the game. Then, the governments of both countries set national emissions caps noncooperatively in the second stage while being influenced by the local organized special interest groups.
The government of country i sets the national emission cap e i such as to maximize
given truthful contribution schedules (5) of the local organized interest groups and given the national emission cap e −i of the other country.
5 In fact, there exist other schedules that support an equilibrium. However, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) showed that lobby groups suffer no loss from playing truthful contribution schedules since each principal's set of best-response strategies contains a truthful contribution schedule. Furthermore, focussing on truthful payment schedules may be justified because they are a simple device to achieve efficiency without any player conceding his right to grab as much as she can for herself.
Assuming strictly positive contribution schedules for all lobby groups j in both countries i, the reaction function of government i is implicitly given by
which implies
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium of this second stage of the game, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 1 (Unique Nash equilibrium in national emissions caps)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game in which all countries i = 1, 2 simultaneously set national emissions caps e i such as to maximize (6) for given emissions e −i of the other country.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
We obtain the same Nash equilibrium as in the corresponding game without lobbying In fact, by defining politically adjusted damage functionsD i (E) as
we are back to the standard case without lobbying, where in equilibrium marginal benefits equal marginal damages in both countries, 
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix. vice versa. However, the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect and the total emissions E follow the national emission cap e i .
International permit markets under lobby group pressure
If the countries have decided to form an international permit market in the first stage of the game, the governments of both countries non-cooperatively decide on the amount of emission permits ω i they will issue in the second stage, which are then traded on a perfectly competitive international permit market at price p. After trade, firms in all countries need (at least) emission permits amounting to emissions e i .
Permit market equilibrium
In the permit market equilibrium, profit maximization in each country implies that marginal benefits equal the permit price:
This implies the well-known equi-marginal principle stating that in equilibrium the marginal benefits of all participating countries are equal. As all marginal benefit functions B ′ i are strictly monotonic, the inverse functions B
exist with
A permit market equilibrium requires total supply of emission permits to equal total emissions:
Equation (13) implicitly determines the permit price p(E) in the market equilibrium, which is a function of the total number of issued emission allowances E. Existence and uniqueness follow directly from the assumed properties of the benefit functions B i .
The following lemma states some important relationships for later use:
Lemma 1 Defining e i (E) ≡ e i p(E) and introducing the abbreviations
the following relationships hold:
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix.
Issuance of emissions permits
If an international permit market is formed in the fist stage, both countries simultaneously choose the level of emission permits ω i in the second stage, taking the truthful contribution schedules (5) and the actions ω −i of the other country as given. Thus, the government in country i chooses ω i such as to maximize its payoff function
subject to equations (5), (12), (13) and given ω −i .
Considering again only strictly positive truthful contribution schedules and taking into account that p(E) = B ′ i e i (E) , the reaction function of country i is given by
Under mild conditions on the benefit functions B i , there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 2 (Unique Nash equilibrium in emissions permits levels)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups and φ ′ i (p) sufficiently small for all i = 1, 2, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the game in which both countries simultaneously set the level of emission permits ω i such as to maximize (16) subject to equations (5), (12), (13) and taking the permit level ω −i of the other country as given.
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
The conditions φ ′ i (p) sufficiently small imply that the benefit functions B i for both countries i = 1, 2 are almost quadratic. For the remainder of the paper we assume that φ ′ i (p) is so small for both countries i = 1, 2 that we may neglect the influence of e ′′ i (E) and p ′′ (E) when we determine the sign of an expression. Under these conditions there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the second stage, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
Again, we observe from equation (17) that the allowance choices ω i and, thus, also national and total emissions only depend on the national levels of organized stakes b i , d i and r i and neither on the number nor the composition of lobby groups, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive equilibrium contribution schedules. However, by re-writing the reaction function (17) to yield
we find that, in contrast to the case of national emission caps, the influence of lobbying on the equilibrium outcome can, in general, not be reduced to politically adjusted damage functions because of the last term on the left-hand side of equation (18). In the special case that r i = b i for both countries, this term vanishes and again, the influence of lobbying can be solely reduced to the politically adjusted damage functions (9). In fact, the case of r i = b i is compatible with a scenario in which the permit market revenues (or costs) accrue solely to the stakeholders of the firms. This is the case, if firms in all countries receive the national permit allocation for free. As this has been the case for most trading schemes that have been implemented so far, we assume for the remainder of this section that
Assumption (19) also allows for a straightforward comparison of the two regimes.
Corollary 2 (Comparative statics of permit issuance)
For r i = b i ,
the following conditions hold for the levels of emission allowances ω i , ω −i
and total emissions E in the Nash equilibrium:
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the Appendix.
As in the case of national emission caps, national emission allowances ω i of country i and also global emissions E are higher the higher are the organized stakes in the benefits and the lower are the organized stakes in the environmental damages in country i. An increase in θ i increases national emission allowances ω i and total emissions E if and only and θ i , country −i decreases its level of emission allowance and vice versa. However, the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect, thus the change in total emissions E exhibits the same sign as the change in national emission allowances ω i . However, the national emission levels e i (E) in both countries always change in the same direction and follow total emissions E, as e ′ i (E) > 0.
Taking into account that r i = b i (i = 1, 2) and summing up the reaction functions (18) for both countries, we find that the equilibrium permit price equals the average politically adjusted marginal damage:
Inserting this equation for the permit price back into the reaction function (18) yields the straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 of Helm (2003):
implying that the country with above average politically adjusted marginal damages buys permits from the country with below average politically adjusted marginal damages. Even if countries are economically identical, an argument for permit trading arises whenever the countries' political environments differ.
Global emissions with and without trading
For the special case r i = b i for i = 1, 2, also Proposition 2 of Helm (2003) carries over in a straightforward manner. Denote the Nash equilibrium in case of national emission caps by e N T i , E N T , and by ω T i , E T in case of an international permit market. Summing up the reaction functions (8) and (18) over both countries, we obtain
Then, the following relationship between total emissions in the trade and no-trade regime follows directly fromD ′′ i ≥ 0: 
Second stage equilibrium contributions
Following Grossman and Helpman (1995a) who characterize equilibrium outcomes for the viability of an international free trade agreement under political pressure, we determine when a country takes a pressured and when it takes an unpressured stance. In order to determine the amount of money which a lobby group is willing to contribute in the first stage, we need to find the equilibrium utility levels of the lobby groups net of their contributions in the second stage.
To this end, we utilize the indifference condition of the government stating that the government must be at least equally well off if the lobby is active compared to the case 6 To see this, note that for the quadratic case, equation (24) can be written as B
. Then, the country with smaller marginal damages (the permit-selling country) exhibits a higher B ′′ i (which is equivalent to a lower absolute value of B
when it is inactive. Depending on whether a permit market is formed in the second stage, the following conditions hold:
where equilibrium emissions and permit choices are denoted by a superscript R ∈ {N T, T } (depending on the regime) when all lobbies are active, and ω
−k
i , e −k and E −k indicate permits and emission levels that would arise if lobby group k did not offer any contributions.
Then, the following proposition holds for the equilibrium contributions of all lobbying groups.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium contributions in the second stage)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, the equilibrium contribution of lobby group k dependent on the choice of regime yields:
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that a particular lobby group k has to compensate the government twofold: On the one hand, it has to recompense proportionally for the loss (gain) in national welfare attributable to the change in emissions or issued permits levels due to the lobby's influence ("social welfare compensation effect"). The proportionality factor equals 1/θ i since lobby contributions enter the government's objective function with a weight of θ i . On the other hand, lobbies have to compensate for the loss (gain) in contributions from all other lobbies due to the change in the government's policy choice resulting from the lobby's influence ("political competition effect"). 7
Proposition 3 yields an important insight. In Section 3 we have seen that -assuming truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules for all lobby groups -the equilibrium outcome only depends on the aggregate national strength b i , d i and r i of lobbying groups but neither on their absolute number nor their composition. However, from Proposition 3 we learn that equilibrium contributions of individual lobbying groups and, thus, also the aggregate lobbying contributions the government receives in the second stage depend on the composition of pressure groups within each country.
Unilateral stances
Knowing Denoting the governments' payoffs minus the lobbying contributions in the first stage by G R i0 , country i's government would oppose the formation of an international emissions permits market if there were no lobbying in the first stage if and only if G N T i0 > G T i0 . As the choice of regime influences, in general, also the payoffs of all lobby groups, lobbies have a strong incentive to offer contributions in the first stage, too. Again, contributions must be non-negative. A lobby is willing to pay to the government in the first stage at most as much as it gains by a change of regime in the second stage, which is given by the difference in the lobby's utilities between both regimes net of lobbying contributions in the second stage. For later reference, we define
First, we examine under which conditions no contributions of all lobby groups in the first stage is a unilateral stance. Therefore, suppose that without lobbying in the first stage the government in country i supports regime R, i.e. G R i0 > GR i0 , whereR = {N T, T } \ R. Suppose further that the first stage contributions of all lobbies in country i are equal to zero. Given that all other lobby groups in country i do not contribute, not contributing itself is a best response for lobby group j if and only if
If inequality (28) 
as otherwise it would be possible for the lobby groups on the winning side to reduce their lobbying contributions and still having their preferred regime choice being adopted.
Moreover, lobby groups on the losing side would offer their total net gain in case the government would adopt their preferred choice. If this were not true, the losers could sway the government in favor of their preferred regime choice by increasing their contributions. And finally, lobbies only pay positive contributions if the government adopts their preferred choice of regime. Let S R (SR) be the set of lobbies which support regime R (R), i.e. for all j ∈ S R (SR), ∆U
R,R ij
> (<) 0 holds. Then, a unilateral stance with positive lobbying contributions in favor of regime R requires:
This condition states that the potential payoff the government is able to collect in the first stage under regime R, consisting of its second-stage equilibrium payoff and the difference in utilities of all lobbies that gain by the introduction of R, must be higher than the potential payoff under the alternative regime. The sum of actual contributions is determined by equation (29).
Note that condition (30) is necessary but not sufficient for a pressured stance in favor of regime R to exist. In addition we need that
otherwise, the supporters of regime R could refrain from positive lobbying contributions and still their preferred regime would be adopted, and we would be back to the case of an unpressured stance. The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 5 (Pressured unilateral stance) There exists a unilateral stance with positive lobbying contributions in favor of regime R in country i if and only if conditions (30) and (31) hold simultaneously.
For a pressured unilateral stance only the sum of lobbying contributions of all winning lobby groups is determined but not its distribution among individual lobby groups.
Thus, there exist, in general, a continuum of pressured unilateral stances, which differ in individual contributions but coincide in the sum of contributions and the adopted regime choice. 8
8 Of course, each individual lobby group j will contribute at most its total utility gain ∆U R,R ij .
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The choice of regime
It may happen that both an unpressured and a pressured unilateral stance exist simultaneously. This holds if condition (28) holds for one regime R = {N T, T } and at the same time conditions (30) and (31) hold for the same or the other regime. If, in addition,
then both stances select the same regime R. Otherwise, there exists a pressured stance in favor of regime R and an unpressured stance supporting regimeR. As Grossman and Helpman (1995a) pointed out, in the case of coexistence unpressured stances are not coalition-proof, a notion introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) . Thus, allowing for a minimum level of communication between the lobby groups eliminates unpressured stances whenever there are also pressured stances. As a consequence, we assume that the pressured stance prevails unless there exists only an unpressured stance.
We know from Sections 3 and 4.1 that the emission levels and the allowance choices in The proof is given in the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is that the necessary condition (30) for the existence of a pressured stance does not depend on the distribution of stakes as long as the national aggregates are constant. This implies that whenever there exists a pressured stance, the selected regime R only depends on the national aggregates of organized stakes. However, for a pressured stance in favor of R to exist, also the necessary condition (31) regime R would be selected. In summary, condition (30), which only depends on the aggregate organized stakes, always holds for one of the two regimes and this regime is also the regime choice of the government (or the government is indifferent between both regimes). Wether the selected regime is a pressured or unpressured stance, however, does depend on the distribution of aggregate organized stakes among individual lobby groups. Of course, also the contributions in the first stage and, thus, the government payoffs and the net utility of the lobby groups depend on the distribution of organized stakes β ij ,δ ij and ρ ij .
International permit markets
Having established each country's choice of regime, it is now straightforward to characterize the conditions under which an international permit market is established. By definition, an international permit market only forms if both countries consent to it, i.e.
if the trading regime is a unilateral stance in both countries. By virtue of Proposition 6, a permit market is thus established if and only if the following condition holds for both countries simultaneously:
Assuming again that equation (19) holds, which implies that r i = b i for both countries, condition (33) reduces to:
As already pointed out by Proposition 4 in Helm (2003) , there are three possible cases: 
where ∈ {b, d, θ} denotes one of the political parameters.
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 3 says that a change in one of the political parameters in country i has a direct effect by changing the politically adjusted damage functionD i (E) (first term on the right-hand side of equation 35a) and an indirect effect by changing the equilibrium choices of emission allowances in both the trading and no-trading regimes. While the first effect is confined to the country whose political parameter changes, the second effect impacts on both countries. The indirect effect can have the same or a different sign in both countries, and it can also have the same or a different sign as the direct effect for the country subject to a change in the political parameters. As a consequence, it may happen that while the direct effect goes in favor of the regime with lower (higher) global emissions due to an increase (decrease) of the politically adjusted damages, the change in ∆G i and/or ∆G −i goes towards the regime with higher (lower) global emissions. If the change in ∆G i and/or ∆G −i is sufficiently strong and opposing the direct effect, we get the counterintuitive result of the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Lobbying may backfire) An increase in the influence of organized interest groups favoring higher (lower) global emissions may actually result in a decrease (increase) of global emissions.
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in the Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose the current regime is the regime with higher ( 
Discussion
Within our framework of legislative lobbying, we found that both the choice of regime 
Conclusion
We have analyzed the non-cooperative formation of an international emission permits market in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. We find that for both the continuous choice of emission allowances in the second stage and the binary choice whether an international permit market is formed only the aggregate levels of organized stakes in each country matter and not their distribution among individual lobby groups. In addition, an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may weaken the support for the interest group's preferred regime in both countries.
Although we found that for given national levels of organized stakes the equilibrium outcome is independent of the number and composition of individual special interest groups, this does not hold for equilibrium contributions and payoffs. In fact, we presume that lobbies with the same interests exert a positive externality on each other. Then, a
higher fragmentation of such lobbies would effectively reduce equilibrium contributions which the government is able to collect. However, the investigation of this issue is left to future research.
In addition, our analysis has focussed on international climate policy by non-cooperative countries. There are, however, some notable exceptions to the extreme case of noncooperation, one of them being the European Union which introduced a permit trading system in 2005. Thus, another promising agenda for future research is the investigation of cooperative international climate policies under political pressure from special interest groups.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the following, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the notrade case.
(i) Existence: The maximization problem of country i is strictly concave, as
Thus, for all countries i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for any given choice e −i of the other country. This guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Solving the best response functions (8) for e i and summing up over both countries yields the following equation for the aggregate emissions E: 10
As the left-hand side is strictly increasing and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in E, there exists a unique level of total emissions E N T in the Nash equilibrium. Substituting back into the reaction functions yields the unique Nash equilibrium (e N T 1 , e N T 2 ).
Proof of Corollary 1
Introducing the abbreviation (A.3) and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions (8) for both countries, we derive
10 As all marginal benefit functions B ′ i are strictly and monotonically decreasing, the inverse functions B ′−1 i exist and are also strictly and monotonically decreasing.
and
For the signs of equations (A.17), we re-write the first-order condition of country i to yield:
Then,
Proof of Lemma 1 Condition (13) of the permit market equilibrium implies
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
We further obtain
Employing the abbreviations (14) yields the stated result.
Proof of Proposition 2
In the following, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the trading scenario.
if e ′′ i (E) and p ′′ (E) are sufficiently small. Thus, for all countries i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for any given choice ω −i of the other countries, which guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Dividing the reaction function (17) by (1 + θ i r i ) and summing up over both countries yields the following condition, which holds in the Nash equilibrium:
For e ′′ i (E) sufficiently small, the left-hand side is strictly decreasing (note that the term in brackets is always positive as e ′ i (E) ∈ [0, 1]), while the right-hand side is increasing in E. Thus, there exists a unique level of total emission allowances E T in the Nash equilibrium.
Inserting E T back into the reaction function (17) yields the unique equilibrium allowance
Proof of Corollary 2
For r i = b i the reaction function (18) of country i reduces to: (A.13) whereD i denotes the politically adjusted damage function (9). Introducing the abbre- (A.14b) and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions (A.13) for both countries, we derive
Proof of Proposition 3
Given the government's indifference conditions (25a) and (25b) (depending on whether a permit market is formed in the second stage), we know that for all participating lobby groups, contributions are either the difference between gross welfare and some reservation welfare R 2,R ij (which is simply a scalar) or zero:
If we assume that C 2,R ij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , M i and all R, we can re-write equations (25a) and (25b) by virtue of condition (A.18b) to yield:
Solving for R k i and inserting into conditions (A.18b), we obtain:
Inserting the lobbies' utilities functions (4b) and (4a) yields equations (26a) and (26b).
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Proof of Proposition 6
Condition (30) is a necessary condition for a pressured stance. We can re-write this condition to yield
Obviously, this condition does not depend on the distribution of organized stakes, as welfare and the sum of the lobby groups' (gross) utilities are determined by the aggregate level of organized stakes b i and d i . This implies that whenever there exists a pressured stance -no matter what the distribution of organized stakes among the individual lobby groups -the pressured stance supports regime R. However, whether a pressured stance exists or not may well depend on the distribution, as condition (31), which also has to hold for the existence of a pressured stance, is not immune to change in the distribution of organized stakes.
Proof of Proposition 7
To prove the proposition, we introduce the special case of quadratic benefit functions and linear environmental damages: (A.22b) where φ i > 0 denotes the country-specific benefit parameter, as defined in Lemma 1 and 30 ǫ i > 0 are the country-specific but constant marginal damages. We define the following shortcut for politically adjusted marginal damages: (A.23) and introduce the following abbreviations for the average benefit parameter and the average politically adjusted marginal damages:
Then, we obtain for the national allowance choices and the global emissions in the two regimes: Global emissions are lower in the trade regime compared to the no-trade regime if the country with the higher φ i exhibits the lower politically adjusted marginal damages ψ i :
Applying these specific functional forms to Corollary 3, we derive
where
We immediately observe that the indirect effect for country i may have the opposite direction compared to the direct effect (first term in (A.27a)) and the total effect of country i may go in the opposite direction of the total effect of country −i. Consider the situation that E N T > E T . In this case the direct effect and the indirect effect for country i have opposing signs. If φ i and φ −i are similar, the direct effect is small and the indirect effect may outweigh the direct effect. If, however, φ i is sufficiently small compared to φ −i the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect. If ψ −i exceeds ψ i (implying that country −i is a permit-buyer) then the total effect of country −i goes in the same direction as the direct effect of country i. Otherwise, if ψ −i is small compared to ψ i (country −i is a permit-seller), the total effect of country −i may go in the opposite direction. If the total effect of one or both countries goes in the opposite direction of the direct effect of country i, then there may be a change of regime towards the regime which is less favored by the interest group that gained influence.
For example, assume that in country i the green lobby gains momentum (i.e. d i increases).
Then the direct effect goes into the direction of the regime with lower emissions, say the trade regime. However, the indirect effect of country i goes in favor of the no-trade regime and may even outweigh the direct effect. As a consequence, the government in country i is less in favor of the trade regime than before the gain in influence. Also the indirect effect in country −i may induce the government of country −i to more strongly oppose the trading regime than before. If the initial regime was the trading regime, the gain in influence of the green lobby in country i may now have caused the support for the trading regime to cease in one or both of the countries. As a consequence, the regime changes towards the no-trade regime. If the no-trading regime exhibits higher total emissions than the trading regime (as assumed), then global emissions rise.
